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NOTES
A PITFALL OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS FAILS WOMEN IN
LEWIS V. THOMPSON*
In times of social and economic crisis, lawmakers
sometimes seek a quick fix to underlying systemic problems by
restricting the rights of our immigrant population.! A recent
example of this type of ill-conceived public policy is a provision
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 19962 ("Welfare Reform Act") that denies
noncitizens federal need-based funding for prenatal care.'
Congress declared that this restriction serves an important
national objective of curbing public expenditures.4 Limiting
noncitizen women's access to adequate prenatal care, however,
actually increases federal spending on medical care for their
© 2002 Michele E. Kenney. All Rights Reserved.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 305 (1986) ("In times of trouble,... fears tend to
focus on particular groups of cultural outsiders as a source of danger. It becomes
convenient to make scapegoats of 'them'-the people who look different from 'us' or
whose language or behavior is foreign to our own."); see generally Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1047, 1048-52 nn.2-13 (1994) (noting measures restricting immigrants' rights).
2 Welfare Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1646 (2000). With some narrow
exceptions, the Welfare Reform Act denies federal public benefits to noncitizens living
in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a). For the limited categories of noncitizens
qualifying for federal benefits under the Welfare Reform Act, see 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(1)-
(7).
3 In discussing the rights of "noncitizens," this Comment focuses on lawful
immigrants as well as persons "permanently residing under color of the law"
("PRUCOL'). The Second Circuit defines the PRUCOL category as including persons
.residing in the United States with the knowledge and permission of the [INS] and
whose departure the [INS] does not contemplate enforcing." Berger v. Heckler, 771
F.2d 1556, 1160 (2d Cir. 1985) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted). The Welfare
Reform Act's residency classifications do not acknowledge PRUCOL status, and deny
most federal benefits to most PRUCOL noncitizens.
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(3)-(6).
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citizen children.5  Congress' other justifications for this
deprivation are equally implausible,6 but according to the
Second Circuit, not too ludicrous.7 The Welfare Reform Act
survived the Second Circuit's equal protection review in Lewis
v. Thompson.8
Lewis ended over two decades of class action litigation
in New York, brought by a group of immigrant women to
challenge evolving federal welfare policies that denied them
Medicaid funding for prenatal care.9 Before the Welfare Reform
Act, the plaintiffs in Lewis triumphed over the federal agency
that sought to restrict their Medicaid benefits by arguing, in
part, that Congress intended for funding to result in expansive
access to prenatal care services. By 1996, however, Congress'
intentions changed. The Welfare Reform Act explicitly denies
Medicaid funding to noncitizens for need-based prenatal care.O
Ultimately, the Second Circuit's unblinking deference to
Congress' broad immigration policy goals caused the court to
dismiss the Lewis plaintiffs' core equal protection argument.
The Second Circuit, like other federal courts in similar cases,"
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Diaz2 as
license to forego a well-reasoned analysis of the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim. In Mathews, the Court unanimously upheld a
federal law that denied Medicare benefits to certain
noncitizens, proclaiming that, "[iun the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.""3
' See infra notes 62, 76-77, 105-06, 108, 151 and accompanying text.
6 The other relevant objectives of the Welfare Reform Act are to promote
self-reliance among immigrants and to deter immigration. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601(2)(A),
(2)(B)(5), (6); infra Part II.A.
7 See infra notes 117-18, 147 and accompanying text.
8 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Lewis VII].
9 The statutory framework for Medicaid is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (West
1992 & Supp. 2002). The Second Circuit and Eastern District of New York issued seven
opinions in Lewis and assigned a number to each decision. For ease of reference, this
Comment refers to particular decisions in Lewis by their court-appointed numbers. See
Lewis VII, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Lewis V]; Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
[hereinafter Lewis VI]; Lewis v. Grinker, 794 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
[hereinafter Lewis IV]; Lewis v. Grinker, No. CV-79-1740, 1987 WL 8412 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 1987) [hereinafter Lewis III]; Lewis v. Grinker, 660 F. Supp. 169 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) [hereinafter Lewis II]; Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
[hereinafter Lewis I].
o See infra notes 82, 112 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.
12 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
13 Id. at 79-80.
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Undoubtedly aware that Mathews's call for judicial deference
would doom their equal protection claim, the Lewis plaintiffs
attempted to raise the bar of equal protection review by
shifting the court's focus to the Welfare Reform Act's impact on
their citizen children. 4
They succeeded with this strategy in the Eastern
District of New York."5 In holding that the federal government
must continue to fund prenatal care services for noncitizens,
the district court's decision focused on the harm that the
plaintiffs' children would suffer as a result of inadequate
prenatal care.'6 From a result-oriented perspective, the district
court reached a humane decision. By framing its equal
protection analysis around the fetus, however, the court
evinced blatant disregard for the constitutional underpinnings
of Roe v. Wade7 and provided a legal forum for the advocacy of
fetal rights. 8
14 If born in the United States, children of noncitizens are entitled to United
States citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000). See infra note 19 for medical studies
attributing the cause of physical and mental disabilities in children to inadequate
prenatal care.
16 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Lewis /V, 794 F.
Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Lewis III, No. CV-79-1740, 1987 WL 8412 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
6, 1987).
16 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not recognize fetuses as "persons." Id. at 157-59.
18 See Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 175, 179-84; Lewis V, 794 F. Supp. at
1199-1200; Lewis II1, 1987 WL 8412, at *7. The district court's reasoning lends
credence to the role of fetal rights in legal decisionmaking and lawmaking. The ease
with which the court disregarded the rights of the plaintiffs and upheld the rights of
their fetuses is troubling, particularly considering current legislative measures
advancing an anti-choice movement. For just one of many examples, members of the
107th Congress recently introduced the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, A Shield of
Protection to Unborn Children. 107 S. 480, 107 H.R. 503, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill
makes inflicting "bodily injury" on, or killing, a "child, who is in utero," a separate
crime when a person physically assaults a pregnant woman. Id. Its proponents attempt
to deflect attention away from the bill's anti-choice overtone by providing that criminal
prosecution will not result from "conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent
of the pregnant woman has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law
in a medical emergency," or for any action that the woman takes "with respect to her
unborn child." Id. The bill defines "child in utero" as "a member of the species homo
sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb." Id.
Further illustrating the prominence of fetal rights in current national
policy, moments after his inauguration, President George W. Bush quickly retracted
financial aid for international health care and human rights organizations that, in
addition to providing critical health services, counsel women on abortion. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Bumiller, U.N. Officials Press White House to Free Family-Planning Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at AS.
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Pregnant women receive prenatal care for the benefit of
their own health, but most certainly to ensure fetal health.19
Further, as medical data indicate, inadequate prenatal care
increases a child's risk of suffering serious and long-lasting
physical and mental disabilities." Although the plaintiffs did
not explicitly argue that the Constitution protected their
children while in utero,2" the Second Circuit recognized the
implication of their argument. In rejecting the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim raised on behalf of their children, the court
soundly reasoned that "[uin our view, recognition of a newborn
child's constitutional challenge to the prior denial of care in
utero is foreclosed by Roe v. Wade just as clearly as would be a
constitutional claim asserted on behalf of a fetus."22 The Second
Circuit held, however, that as soon as these children were born,
their right to federally funded medical treatment vested
immediately.23
It might seem inevitable that the courts would consider
the plaintiffs' children in their equal protection analyses, since
children are arguably the main beneficiaries of prenatal care.
Yet, the fundamental equal protection issue in Lewis did not
implicate the plaintiffs' children, and neither the district court
nor the circuit court should have oriented its analysis around
the equal protection rights of fetuses. Instead, their analyses
"' See, e.g., Lewis III, 1987 WL 8413, at *7-8 (discussing statistics on the
relationship between inadequate prenatal care and "low birth weight . . . mental
retardation, birth defects, growth and development problems, blindness, autism,
cerebral palsy, and epilepsy"); see also Maureen Hack et al., Outcomes in Young
Adulthood for Very-Low-Birth-Weight Infants, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 17, 2002, at 149,
156 (linking low birth weight with neurological deficiencies causing, among other
problems, "poor school achievement that ... persist[s] into young adulthood"); Marie C.
McCormick & Douglas K. Richardson, Premature Infants Grow Up, NEW ENG. J. MED.,
Jan. 17, 2002, at 197, 198 (arguing that improved prenatal and neonatal care should
reduce incidence of low birth weight); John L. Sullivan & Katherine Luzuriaga, The
Changing Face of Pediatric HIV-1 Infection, NEW ENG. J. MED., Nov. 22, 2001, at 1568
("In 2001, the combination of routine prenatal screening for HIV-1 and antiretroviral
therapy in mothers and infants has markedly reduced the incidence of mother-to-child
transmission."); Robert McDuffie et al., Effect of Frequency of Prenatal Care Visits on
Perinatal Outcome Among Low-Risk Women, JAMA, Mar. 20, 1996, at 847, 851
("Observational studies of mothers receiving adequate prenatal care have
demonstrated fewer preterm births, higher birth weights, fewer low-birth-weight and
very low-birth-weight neonates, and fewer stillbirths and neonatal deaths compared
with mothers receiving inadequate prenatal care.") (citations omitted).
'0 See supra note 19.
21 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 585.
22 Id. The court concluded, "Roe's preclusion of a Fourteenth Amendment
right for a fetus would evaporate if a child could assert a constitutional claim for
prebirth injury." Id.
23 Id. at 589-92.
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should have focused on whether denying pregnant noncitizens
federal need-based funding for prenatal care is logically related
to Congress' purported welfare and immigration policy goals.
Both courts hastily rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection
claim 4 by assuming that Congress could deny noncitizens
funding for prenatal care under its "broad power"25 over the
realm of immigration and naturalization policy. Yet, the
deprivation of funding for prenatal care is wholly irrelevant,
indeed counterproductive, to the Welfare Reform Act's
objectives.
Although entrenched precedent supports the judiciary's
deferential review of equal protection claims brought by
noncitizens against the federal government, 6 Lewis calls into
question the legitimacy of such extreme deference to Congress.
When one frames the plaintiffs' constitutional claim in a
broader context of the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, particularly considering the Court's
requirement that strict scrutiny apply to state alienage
classifications, justifications for the courts' closer review
emerge.27 Furthermore, because it is implausible that the
Welfare Reform Act provisions challenged in Lewis implicate
immigration or naturalization concerns, Congress likely
exceeded the bounds of its constitutional authority in creating
a citizenship requirement for need-based funding for prenatal
care services.
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit's
unyielding deference to congressional immigration policy
deprived the Lewis plaintiffs of their equal protection rights.
The premise underlying this argument is that the federal
judiciary should not automatically cast aside its ultimate
authority to review discriminatory legislative acts in all cases
where Congress purports to act under the aegis of its
immigration powers.
Part I provides an overview of the Lewis litigation as
the case traveled between the Eastern District of New York
and the Second Circuit over the course of twenty years. In Part
II, this Comment argues that both courts overlooked the core
equal protection claim in Lewis, by focusing on fetuses, rather
That is, the claim that withholding funding for prenatal care based on
citizenship status violates the plaintiffs'-not their children's-equal protection rights.
25 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
26 See, e.g., id.; see also discussion infra Part III.
21 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); infra Part II.B.
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than engaging in an appropriate analysis of the challenged
law's basis as it applied to the plaintiffs. First, this Part
analyzes the relationship between Congress' immigration
policy goals and the Welfare Reform Act provisions that deny
noncitizens prenatal care. Second, it explores components of
the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence that
provide additional avenues for reviewing the plaintiffs' claim
with greater scrutiny than the Lewis courts' exceedingly
deferential rational basis review. Finally, Part III briefly
considers the constitutional boundaries of Congress' power to
deny funding for prenatal care based on citizenship status. It
concludes that the Second Circuit wrongly presumed that
Congress' power over immigration and naturalization
automatically confers authority to deprive noncitizens need-
based funding for prenatal care.2"
I. Two DECADES OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION IN LEWIS V.
THOMPSON
When Congress enacted the Medicaid statute in 1965, it
made no mention of a citizenship requirement.29 In 1973,
" In 2001, the 107th Congress proposed legislation that would modify the
Welfare Reform Act by giving individual states an option to provide prenatal care
services through the federal Medicaid program to pregnant women lawfully residing in
this country. See S. 1244, 107th Cong. § 5 (July 25, 2001), H.R. 1143, 107th Cong. § 2
(Mar. 21, 2001). This legislation is pending congressional approval. Its enactment,
however, would not settle the broader issue of extreme judicial deference to Congress in
cases where the equal protection rights of noncitizens are at stake. Furthermore, in
authorizing states to determine whether to provide welfare benefits to lawfully residing
noncitizens, the proposed bills stand on shaky constitutional footing. See Graham, 403
U.S. at 382 ("Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual States to
violate the Equal Protection Clause."). Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals recently
declared unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions a state law
denying state Medicaid benefits to PRUCOLs. See Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418,
754 N.E.2d 1085, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2001). After Congress enacted the Welfare Reform
Act, New York passed a statute terminating Medicaid coverage for many noncitizens
previously covered by the state. Id. at 427. The Novello court determined that the
Welfare Reform Act, in giving states the option to provide benefits to noncitizens,
"impermissibly authorizes each State to decide whether to disqualify many otherwise
eligible aliens from State Medicaid." Id. at 436. See also Michael J. Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (arguing that the Welfare Reform Act
withstands rational basis review, but that Congress cannot devolve power to states by
allowing them to chose whether to adopt the Welfare Reform Act's alienage
classifications).
29 See, e.g., Lewis VII, 252 F.3d 567, 571 (2d Cir. 2001). Medicaid is a
'cooperative federallstate cost-sharing program designed to enable participating states
to furnish medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical care and services." Lewis 1, 663 F. Supp. 1164,
1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 318 (1985)).
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without Congress' approval, the Department of Health
Education and Welfare-now the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS)-changed its Medicaid distribution
policy to require that recipients be either citizens, or
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law"
("PRUCOL").3° In 1979, plaintiff representative Lydia Lewis
filed a class action lawsuit to challenge this agency regulation
as it pertained to all Medicaid benefits, including funding for
prenatal care."' The initial incarnation of this class included
noncitizens who were "living outside the color of the law," also
known as non-PRUCOL, or, in common vernacular, as "illegal
aliens."2 Over the next two decades, as federal law concerning
public benefits evolved, sometimes in direct response to the
Lewis litigation," the plaintiff class reshaped its membership
and claims.34 Most recently, the plaintiffs challenged their
disqualification from Medicaid for prenatal care under the
Welfare Reform Act." The following case history tracks the
development and outcomes of the Lewis litigation. Sections A
through E briefly convey the pre-Welfare Reform Act holdings,
while Sections F and G concentrate on the post-Welfare Reform
Act litigation.
A. Lewis I'3
In Lewis I, the Eastern District of New York certified a
plaintiff class comprised of "all aliens residing in New York
State who have applied or attempted to apply for Medicaid but
have been or would be denied on the basis of their alienage."37
The plaintiffs asserted that the Medicaid statute prohibited a
HHS policy that denied them Medicaid coverage. The court
agreed, determining that HHS overstepped the bounds of its
authority by imposing a citizenship restriction on the
30 Lewis 1, 663 F. Supp. at 1178; see also supra note 3.
31 Lewis I, 663 F. Supp. at 1177.
32 Id. at 1166.
" See Lewis 11, 660 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
" See id. at 173.
15 See Lewis VII, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001); Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
36 663 F. Supp. 1164.
"7 Id. at 1170-71.
Id. at 1174. The plaintiffs also argued that the agency regulation violated
their due process rights. Id. Siding with the plaintiffs on their statutory claim, the
court never reached the constitutional question. Id. at 1174.
20021
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distribution of Medicaid funds without congressional
approval.39
The district court issued an injunction against HHS,
requiring the agency to provide Medicaid coverage for the
plaintiff class. ' ° Notably, while the plaintiffs demanded
Medicaid funding for all medical services, the district court
commented that each level of Medicaid coverage also included
41benefits for pregnant women.
B. Lewis 1142
Responding to the district court's holding in Lewis i,41
Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986 ("OBRA '86")." OBRA '86 provided statutory authority for
the residency restriction that HHS sought in Lewis I, by
imposing a PRUCOL requirement for Medicaid eligibility.'
OBRA '86 restricted Medicaid eligibility to noncitizens who
were "either lawful permanent residents or otherwise
permanently residing in this country under color of law."4
Armed with this new legislation, HHS moved to lift the
injunction against its practice of denying Medicaid benefits to
non-PRUCOL immigrants. 7
OBRA '86 clearly denied non-PRUCOL immigrants
Medicaid eligibility. Therefore, the district court vacated the
injunction." It sought to lessen the sting of this new law,
however, by emphasizing that Congress' broad and inclusive
definition of PRUCOL embraced "all of the categories [of
permanent residency] recognized by immigration law, policy,
and practice."49
'9 Id. at 1174, 1183.
40 Id. at 1184.
41 Lewis I, 663 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
42 660 F. Supp. 169 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
41 Id. at 172-73.
44 Id. at 170; see The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986).
45 660 F. Supp. at 170.
46 Id. OBRA '86 allowed for emergency care services regardless of PRUCOL
status.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 170-74.
41 Id. at 173.
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C. Lewis III"°
After OBRA '86, the plaintiff class argued that the
Medicaid statute still required HHS to provide prenatal care to
non-PRUCOL women."' The district court agreed.52 Empirical
data convinced the court that inadequate prenatal care causes
"irreparable harm" to both pregnant women and their
children." Furthermore, the court was influenced by HHS's
established practice of providing Medicaid benefits for prenatal
care to otherwise ineligible women "if the child would be
eligible [for Medicaid] when born."54
Backing away from this practice, HHS argued that it
could no longer assume that unqualified pregnant women
would actually deliver their children in this country after
reaping the benefits of prenatal care.55 The court dismissed this
argument as lacking "common sense." 6 In reaching its decision
to require Medicaid funding for prenatal care services, the
district court relied on a "longstanding" understanding between
HHS and its New York State counterpart that Medicaid's
provisions for "individuals under the age of 21" included the
unborn.57 Absent a clear statutory directive otherwise, the court
issued a preliminary injunction against HHS, requiring the
agency to provide prenatal care funding for all financially
50 No. CV-79-1740, 1987 WL 8412 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1987).
" Id. at *2.
52 Id. at *9-10. The plaintiffs also challenged HHS's definition of
"permanently residing under color of law" as too narrow. Id. at *2. Finding the phrase
"PRUCOL" broad and vague, the district court held that HHS possessed authority to
require INS's knowledge and approval of an immigrant's presence before approving
Medicaid disbursements. Id. at *11. The court, however, noted that if INS delays and
lack of cooperation unduly hampered the plaintiffs' ability to achieve PRUCOL status,
they could raise a procedural due process claim. Id. at *12.
" Id. at *7-8. The court cited studies indicating that "death rates of newborns
whose mothers did not receive prenatal care were four times higher than the death
rates of newborns whose mothers received some prenatal care," impressed the court, as
did statistics correlating inadequate prenatal care with "low birth weight ... mental
retardation, birth defects, growth and development problems, blindness, autism,
cerebral palsy, and epilepsy." Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
"' Lewis III, 1987 WL 8412, at *8.
56 Id.
17 Id. at *9. HHS argued that the Supreme Court's holding that the unborn
are not dependent children for purposes of the federal program, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, precluded Medicaid funding for prenatal care. Id. at *9
(discussing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975)). The court found Burns inapposite,
noting that the Supreme Court's decision was somewhat influenced by expansive
health care provisions for pregnant women in another federal program. Id. at *9 &
n.15.
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qualified pregnant women, regardless of their residency
status. 8
D. Lewis IV59
Four years after its Lewis III decision, the district court
considered the plaintiff class' right to prenatal care at greater
length and made its preliminary injunction against HHS
permanent."0 Both the Lewis class and HHS agreed that
"[c]hildren who do not receive prenatal care are . . .far more
likely to be born with severe and debilitating mental and
physical deformities."6 Both parties also agreed that "from a
cost effectiveness perspective prenatal care is far superior to
subsequent treatment of preventable birth defects." 2 Despite
these agreements, HHS argued that "qualified pregnant
women" under the Medicaid statute required PRUCOL status."
Rejecting HHS's argument, the district court interpreted the
Medicaid statute as authorizing prenatal care coverage for non-
PRUCOL women.6"
Departing from its reasoning in Lewis III, the court
acknowledged that Roe v. Wade foreclosed interpretation of the
phrase "individuals under the age of 21" as including the
unborn, since "[tihe unborn are not 'persons' under the
Constitution."65 The court's analysis of the Medicaid statute,
however, "reveal[ed] that the fetus is entitled to receive aid
' Id. at *9.
59 794 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
60 Id. at 1195. The plaintiffs also challenged HHS's practice of denying
Medicaid to undocumented immigrant children. Since both parties disagreed on INS
procedures regarding immigrant children, the court ordered a separate hearing on this
issue. Id. at 1206.
61 Id. at 1196.
62 Id. The court cited a House Budget Committee report that stated, "each
dollar spent on prenatal care could save over three dollars in reduced heath care costs
for the care of low birth weight infants." Id. at 1201.
63 Id. at 1197. HHS argued that the plain meaning of OBRA '86, together
with changes to statutory provisions for other federal aid programs that exclude
coverage provisions for the "unborn," allowed it to deny non-PRUCOL women prenatal
care funding. Id. at 1198. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that while
Congress abandoned express coverage provisions for the "unborn," it simultaneously
expanded coverage for pregnant women in another federal aid program. Id. The court
stated: "Congress appears, as a matter of legislative style, to have chosen to use the
pregnant women eligibility group as the vehicle for providing Medicaid coverage of
prenatal care," rather than identifying the intended aid-recipient as the unborn. Id.
r4 Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. at 1200. The court noted that the Medicaid statute
"does not directly address the issue of coverage for the unborn children of alien women
not themselves eligible for Medicaid." Id. at 1198.
6 Id. at 1198 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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through its mother, even where the mother, prior to pregnancy,
is not herself, by reason of her status with INS, eligible for
aid."66
The Medicaid statute defined "qualified pregnant
women" as all pregnant women who would meet the financial
qualification requirements "if their unborn children were
already born and were living with them at the time of
payment."67 The court determined that this "constructive
infant"" approach demonstrated Congress' focus on the "needs
of the unborn child[,I . . . not the parent."69 The court further
found that Congress' "concentration of attention is upon the
children or unborn children, and the mother becomes a
convenient means through which this aid to the child can be
furnished.... Non-PRUCOL pregnant aliens serve simply as
the conduit for delivering the aid to their children."7"
Interpreting the Medicaid statute to include coverage
for prenatal care, the court declined to rule on the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim, thereby avoiding "substantial
constitutional questions of considerable difficulty."7
E. Lewis V7
In 1992, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's
injunction against HHS.7 Unlike the lower court, however, it
agreed with HHS that the plain meaning of the amended
Medicaid statute required PRUCOL status.74 Yet, the court
ultimately determined that Congress intended for a continuous
allocation of prenatal care funding for non-PRUCOL women. 5
The court regarded Lewis as a unique case in which the
law's purpose should trump its plain meaning. Relying on
Medicaid's legislative history, the court found that providing
prenatal care for non-PRUCOL women supported "the clearly
66 Id. at 1199.
67 Id. at 1198-99. The court explained: "Given the current constitutional
problems surrounding the rights of fetuses, it makes perfect sense that Congress
should choose this more indirect route toward supplying [fetuses] with aid." Id. at 1200
n.3.
68 Id. at 1200.
69 Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. at 1199.
70 Id. at 1200-01.
71 Id. at 1202.
72 965 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992).
73 Id. at 1208.
74 Id. at 1215.
75 Id.
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expressed Congressional purpose of curbing expenditures.""
The court cited a congressional report that stated, "every dollar
spent on prenatal care saves between two and ten dollars in
future medical care costs."77 Impressed by Congress' desire to
expand rather than contract prenatal care access, the court
interpreted OBRA '86 in derogation of its plain meaning. 8
Thus, if Congress wanted to restrict prenatal care funding, it
would have to enact unequivocal legislation to accomplish that
end.
F. Lewis VI
The Welfare Reform Act of 199680 required HHS to deny
Medicaid funding for prenatal care services to all non-
PRUCOL, and nearly all PRUCOL, women.8' The district court
quickly determined that the text and legislative history of the
Welfare Reform Act precluded a statutory argument for the
plaintiffs' continued Medicaid eligibility.82 Therefore, the court
addressed the plaintiffs' claim that this deprivation violated
their rights, and the separate claim that this law violated their
children's rights, to equal protection of the laws.
76 Id. at 1219.
77 Lewis V, 965 F. 2d at 1219 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-727, at 98, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3688).
78 Id. The court's holding freed it from the responsibility of deciding whether
the plaintiffs could assert an equal protection claim on behalf of their children.
However, the court noted that interpreting the Medicaid statute to deny prenatal care
funding could raise a constitutional problem. See id. at 1217-20. Since a child is
automatically eligible for Medicaid if their mother is covered, a non-PRUCOL woman's
child would not receive automatic coverage under HHS's interpretation of the statute.
While the court did not directly address the constitutional issue, it noted that "[sluch
discrimination against the citizen child on the basis of the alien status of the parent
would raise serious equal protection questions."Id. at 1217.
79 111 F. Supp. 2d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
80 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1646 (2001).
"1 See id. §§ 1611, 1612, 1641. The court noted that the Welfare Reform Act's
limited eligibility categories rendered the PRUCOL classification obsolete. Lewis VI,
111 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52 & n.ll.
82 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 155-64. Supporting its conclusion, the court
referred to a House of Representatives Conference Report stating that, "[t]he allowance
for emergency medical services under Medicaid is very narrow .... The conferees do not
intend that emergency medical services include prenatal care or delivery care assistance
that is not strictly of an emergency nature." Id. at 157 (quoting 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649,
2767-68) (emphasis in original). Regarding the plaintiffs' reliance on congressional
intent to save money and to promote the health of children, the court stated, "Congress'
broad purposes cannot be used to trump the plain language of a statute bolstered by a
relatively clear expression of intent from the legislative history of the statute under
interpretation." Id. at 161.
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The court recognized the plaintiffs' standing to raise an
equal protection claim on their own behalf, reasoning that
"they will bear the primary economic, social, and emotional
burdens of caring for these children."83 The court also granted
them standing to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of
their children, finding that "the injuries that will be sustained
by their citizen children as a result of [the Welfare Reform Act]
involves disparate treatment of United States citizens." '
HHS challenged the plaintiffs' standing to raise either
claim, arguing under Roe v. Wade that, "[s]ince a fetus is not a
person, or in being, it does not itself have standing and a
fortiori neither does the mother."5 Swiftly rejecting the notion
that the plaintiffs' claims necessarily implicated fetal rights,
the court dismissed HHS's standing challenge: "Whether or not
plaintiffs may assert an equal protection claim on behalf of
their unborn children, they clearly may assert an equal
protection claim on behalf of their already-born citizen
children, and it is essentially on that claim that they are
entitled to prevail in this lawsuit."6
The court agreed with HHS that it should apply
deferential rational basis review to the plaintiffs' claim, based
on a settled understanding that Congress "has broad plenary
authority over matters of immigration and naturalization, and
in exercising this authority, Congress has the power to treat
aliens differently from citizens."87 Relying on Mathews v. Diaz,"
and without addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the
court deferred to Congress, holding that the Welfare Reform
Act's discrimination against the plaintiffs was supported by a
rational basis.89
As for the equal protection claim that the plaintiffs
brought on behalf of their children, the district court applied
intermediate scrutiny.9" This heightened standard of review
Id. at 164.
4 Id. at 165.
8 Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
"' Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 169, 170-72 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976)). HHS also cited challenges to the Welfare Reform Act in other jurisdictions
where courts applied deferential rational basis review. Id. at 173.
88 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.").
89 Id. at 182.
90 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75.
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required the challenged Welfare Reform Act provisions to be
"substantially related to a legitimate congressional objective,"9
which "further[s] 'some substantial goal' in comparison to its
costs to the Nation."92 The court elevated the standard of review
based on Plyler v. Doe,9 an unusual case where the Supreme
Court applied intermediate scrutiny to a state law denying
illegal immigrant children access to public education. The
district court reasoned that, like the challenged law in Plyler,
the Welfare Reform Act's residency classifications "will result
in the imposition of severe and lifelong burdens on a discrete
class of innocent citizen children unaccountable for their
disabling status."94 Convinced that the government should not
punish children for the actions of their parents, the court
analogized discrimination against the children in Lewis to an
"archaic corruption of the blood" long opposed by the Supreme
Court. 9 5
HHS argued that a denial of prenatal care serves the
"compelling government interest" of removing an incentive for
illegal immigration.96 While the court agreed that Congress
might legitimately enact laws to discourage illegal
immigration, it rejected HHS's claim that prenatal care
funding creates an incentive for illegal immigration as "highly
speculative."97 The court found that a "much more plausible
scenario"9" is one where immigrant women, denied prenatal
care services, found themselves "unable or unwilling to leave
despite the unavailability of prenatal care."99
Secondly, HHS claimed that the denial of prenatal care
furthered the Welfare Reform Act's goal of promoting self-
91 Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
92 Id. at 182-83.
93 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
94 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 170. While other federal courts rejected
application of the Plyler standard to Welfare Reform Act challenges, the court
distinguished Lewis on the grounds that it involved citizen children, rather than
noncitizens. Id. at 180.
95 Id. at 179 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 n.5 (1968)). The court
discussed at length "the long line of cases in which the [Supreme] Court has subjected
federal and state legislative classifications that impose disabilities on innocent children
on the sole basis of the conduct of their parents to more rigorous judicial review." Id. at
176.
96 Id. at 184.
97 Id. (quoting Lewis V, 965 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, the
court responded that "[a]s the Supreme Court observed in Plyler, the dominant
incentive for illegal entry in most states is the availability of employment." Id.
9 Id. at 184.
99 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
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sufficiency, thereby reducing a burden on the public benefits
system.00 Rejecting this argument, the court stated that most
women denied prenatal care by the Welfare Reform Act were
unable to afford any type of private medical care.' Since the
correlation between inadequate prenatal care and physical
harm to newborns was "not disputed,"0 2 the court reasoned
that mothers would be forced to dedicate a significant amount
of time and money to the care of their injured children, which
would "prevent [these women] from leading economically
productive lives. "'°s
Finally, HHS argued that a denial of prenatal care
served the compelling government interest of decreasing public
expenditures.' The court also rejected this argument, firmly
stating that it is "undisputed that routine prenatal care is more
cost-effective than treating preventable birth defects and low
birth weight after a child's birth." 5 Additionally, the court was
persuaded by well documented evidence that "[tihe nation will
be forced to bear the significant medical costs of caring for
these citizen children after their birth." 6 Therefore, the court
concluded that the cost-saving aspects of prenatal care "far
outweigh the speculative benefits on which" 7 HHS relied.' 8
Convinced that prenatal care is vital to a child's health,
the court contradicted its earlier statement that the children's
equal protection claim need not implicate the rights of fetuses,
stating: "Although prenatal care is provided through the
mother, it is clear that prenatal care is provided principally for
10 Id. at 184-85.
1o' Id. at 185.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 185 (quoting Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
... Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
105 Id.
10 Id. at 183 n.54. The court continued:
Moreover, of those children who survive, many will be denied the opportunity
to lead productive or fulfilling lives in this country as a result of the
handicaps related to the birth defects they will sustain and, as a result, will
be forced to depend upon a variety of social welfare programs.
Id.
107 Id.
10" Additionally, the court referred to a New York State Department of Health
finding that the preventative nature of prenatal care for undocumented noncitizens
alone "saves an estimated $14.7 million just in the costs of providing initial
hospitalization for these babies." Id. at 154. The court noted further that these savings
did not take into account "the extraordinary additional costs of providing lifelong
medical care or the lifelong expense of special education for babies born with severe
birth defects." Id. at 154.
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the benefit of the fetus.""°9 Finding HHS's reasons for denying
the plaintiff class prenatal care "wholly insubstantial" in
relation to the costs exacted by this deprivation, the court
upheld its injunction against HHS to vindicate the equal
protection rights of the plaintiff class' children."0
G. Lewis VII"'
The Second Circuit concurred with the district court's
holding that the only possible interpretation of the Welfare
Reform Act was that it excluded the plaintiffs from Medicaid-
eligibility for prenatal care."' It also agreed that a denial of
prenatal care did not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection
rights."1
3
The court relied on the "indisputable teaching of
Mathews v. Diaz," 1. and applied a "highly deferential standard"
of review to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim."5 It explained
that, under rational basis review, the plaintiffs must "negative
every conceivable basis which might support" the law."6
Applying this test, the court found that the Welfare Reform
Act's first rationale, deterrence of illegal immigration, provided
enough basis for discrimination against the plaintiffs."7 While
recognizing that "the record discloses no evidence that a
prospective illegal immigrant considers the unavailability of
prenatal care in deliberating whether to illegally enter the
country," the court reiterated that "such evidence is not
required to satisfy rational basis analysis.""' 8
109 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 154. The court initially stated that the
children's disparate impact claim was based on their inability to receive automatic
Medicaid eligibility at their birth, as the Medicaid statute provides that a child born to
a mother who receives Medicaid is entitled to automatic Medicaid coverage. Id. at 166,
175. Yet, the court explained its holding by focusing on the harm suffered by the
children due to inadequate prenatal care.
"o Id. at 185-86.
... 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001).
... Id. at 580. The court found that the Welfare Reform Act unequivocally
excluded federal benefits and non-emergency Medicaid assistance for non-PRUCOL as
well as "a sizeable class of PRUCOL" immigrants. Id. at 578.
"' See id. at 584.
114 Id. at 582 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)).
"5 Id. (quoting Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2000)).
116 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 582 (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88
(1940)).
"7 Id.
118 Id. at 583 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). The court also
referred to other challenges to the Welfare Reform Act in different federal jurisdictions
where courts held that the Welfare Reform Act survived rational basis scrutiny. Id.
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The Second Circuit next considered the Welfare Reform
Act's constitutionality as it applied to the plaintiffs' children. 119
As in the earlier Lewis opinions, the Second Circuit recognized
the health and economic impacts of inadequate prenatal care.'
Yet, the plaintiffs' contention that their citizen children could
challenge the law failed to persuade the court.' Unconvinced
by the plaintiffs' attempt to deflect attention away from the
fetus, the court stated, "[i]f, as Roe v. Wade instructs, a fetus
lacks constitutional protection to assure it an opportunity to be
born, we see no basis for according it constitutional protection
to assure enhanced prospects for good health after birth."'22
Thus, the circuit court reversed the district court and sustained
the Welfare Reform Act's categorical exclusion of the plaintiff
class from Medicaid eligibility for need-based prenatal care
funding.'
While the court did not recognize the plaintiffs' or their
children's rights to prenatal care," ' it required HHS to develop
automatic coverage procedures for the plaintiffs' children so
that they could receive immediate medical care upon birth.'
Twenty-three years after instituting this class action,
the Lewis plaintiffs lost their right of equal access to need-
based federal funding for prenatal care. Throughout the Lewis
119 Id. at 584-85 (determining that the plaintiffs had third party standing to
raise an equal protection claim on behalf of their infant children).
120 Id. at 579-80.
121 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 586.
122 Id. Responding to the plaintiffs' argument that a majority of states provide
tort law causes of action for wrongful death caused by prenatal injuries, the court
stated that "a legislative benefit does not imply a constitutional requirement." Id. The
court distinguished a Ninth Circuit case that recognized a child's constitutional claim
for deprivation of family relationship when his father was killed while he was in utero,
on the grounds that in the instant case, "the alleged deprivation... was suffered while
the fetus was in utero. At that moment the fetus had no constitutional right to equal
protection, and the born child's subsequent protection by the Equal Protection Clause
cannot retroactively create a claim that was not cognizable before birth." Id. at 587
(discussing Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991)). The court emphasized
that in Crumpton, the alleged deprivation began once the child was born, and no
earlier. Id.
'n Id. at 587.
1 Id. at 591-92. Here the court expressed its comfort with applying a higher
standard of review to the children's equal protection claim under Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), because the children were citizens and the discrimination they suffered
resulted from their mothers' classification as unqualified noncitizens under the Welfare
Reform Act. Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 590-92. The court even suggested that the children's
lack of automatic Medicaid eligibility based on their mothers' status "might be the rare
case where the equal protection claim would prevail" under rational basis review, but it
did not reach a decision on these grounds. Id. at 590.
125 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 592.
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litigation, both the district and circuit courts consistently found
that denying pregnant noncitizens funding for prenatal care
actually costs more money than it saves, and strongly rejected
the notion that a deprivation of prenatal care might deter
immigration or engender self-reliance. Despite these findings,
both courts held that the Welfare Reform Act's residency
classification survived rational basis review. If the courts had
correlated their findings on the effects of inadequate prenatal
care with the law's stated objectives, they would have found
that the Welfare Reform Act's means lack a rational
relationship to its ends.
II. UPHOLDING EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WITH
MEASURED DEFERENCE
A. Reconsidering Lewis Under the Rational Basis Test
The Supreme Court has applied the standard of rational
basis review in myriad ways,'26 but essentially has required a
"rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose."'27 At one end of the
rational basis spectrum, the Court has required the
relationship between a law's means and ends to be "at least
debatable" 8 or only based on "rational speculation."'29 At the
opposite end of this spectrum, the Court has questioned the
legitimacy of the government's interests by more closely
analyzing the relationship between the law's means and
ends.' Under even the most deferential application of rational
basis review, the exclusionary residency classifications of the
Welfare Reform Act at issue in Lewis violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.'
"' The Court, however, has sometimes insisted that the rational basis test is
uniform and unvarying. See, e.g., infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
127 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
128 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). See generally
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (upholding statute requiring an
optometrist's prescription in order to replace eye glass lenses: "[Tihe law need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional").
129 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
130 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
"' The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment's due process guarantee requires that the federal government act within
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The preamble to the Welfare Reform Act provides
Congress' "statements concerning national policy with respect
to welfare and immigration"'32 and identifies the law's three
objectives: (1) to promote the noncitizen's self-reliance;... (2) to
provide a disincentive for immigration;34 and (3) to ensure that
noncitizens do not burden public welfare programs."'
The first stated objective of the residency requirements
for public benefits under the Welfare Reform Act is to
encourage "aliens . . . [to] rely on their own capabilities."36
When the district court considered this objective in relation to
the means by which Congress sought to reach it, the court
strongly asserted that there is no connection between a denial
of prenatal care and the promotion of self-sufficiency."'
Although the court entertained the possibility of this
connection under heightened review of the children's equal
protection claim, the force with which it dismissed HHS's
argument indicates the weakness of this rationale."8 Finding
that most women who depend on government funding for need-
based prenatal care are unable to afford adequate private
medical care, the court concluded that the "time and
resources""9 the disqualified mothers must spend caring for
their injured children would render them unable to attain self-
sufficiency. 4 °
At no point did either court express how the law's end
related to its means in their consideration of the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim. Yet, in considering the children's equal
protection claim, the district court emphatically stated that the
ends and means do not relate.' With as much ease and
justification under rational basis review, the court could have
determined that depriving indigent women prenatal care bears
the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has
recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.").
132 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
133 Id. § 1601(1), (2)(A), (5).
134 Id. § 1601(2)(B), (6).
Id. § 1601(3), (4).
Id. § 1601(2)(A).
Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
131 See id.
"9 Id. (quoting Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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no rational relationship to the promotion of self-sufficiency. As
plentiful data on the devastating and debilitating effects of
inadequate prenatal care (wholly accepted by the courts)
indicate, the suggestion that a deprivation of prenatal care will
lead to self-sufficiency is preposterous.
14 2
Likewise, it is inconceivable that denying women
prenatal care relates to the Welfare Reform Act's second
objective of deterring illegal immigration. In enacting this
welfare reform, Congress stated that "[i]t is a compelling
government interest to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits."'43
Both courts found it implausible that an opportunity to access
prenatal care might spur immigration.' Yet, the courts
ultimately threw these findings to the wind, deferring to
Congress' policy objective.
In Lewis VI, the district court declared that immigrant
women denied funding for prenatal care would probably be
"unable or unwilling to leave despite the unavailability of
prenatal care."'45 Like the district court, the Second Circuit
admitted "it seems likely that many alien women will illegally
immigrate to obtain the benefit of citizenship for their children,
undeterred by ineligibility for prenatal care in the event of
pregnancy."146 However, the circuit court further stated that
"[i]n the realm of immigration, where congressional discretion
is extremely broad, this supposition, even if dubious, satisfies
rational basis review."'47 Notably, the court failed to explain
how "rational speculation" links the law's objectives to its
discriminatory requirements.4 ' Its silence in this regard
endorses Congress' irrational assertion rather than rational
speculation.'49
142 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
143 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6) (2000).
144 See Lewis VII, 252 F.3d 567, 584-85 (2d Cir. 2001); Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp.
2d at 184; see also Linda S. Bosniak, supra note 1, at 1145 n.396 (quoting statement of
Mexico's consul general in Los Angeles that public benefits do not encourage
immigration, but, rather, "[t]he demand for low-cost labor brings immigrant workers
seeking better incomes for their families").
14' Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
146 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 584.
141 Id. (emphasis added).
148 Id.
141 See Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens' Access to Public
Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475, 1506-07
(1995) (arguing that restrictions on public benefits fail to address the "root causes" of
immigration).
[Vol. 68: 2
A PITFALL OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Denying prenatal care services to noncitizens actually
undermines the Welfare Reform Act's final stated objective of
relieving a "burden" on the public welfare system.' In addition
to simple logic, voluminous data forces the conclusion that
some money spent on prenatal care saves much more money on
the remedial health care necessitated by inadequate prenatal
care. 5 ' Indeed, before Congress enacted the welfare reform
laws in 1996, both courts upheld the plaintiffs' right to federal
funding for prenatal care as a matter of sound economic
policy. 5 '
The courts' reliance on congressional fiscal reports in
the pre-Welfare Reform Act litigation makes their acceptance
of Congress' post-Welfare Reform Act assertion that restricting
prenatal care unburdens the public coffers particularly
unjustifiable. In the earlier phase of the Lewis litigation, both
courts approvingly cited a House Budget Committee Report
finding that "each dollar spent on prenatal care could save over
three dollars in reduced heath care costs for the care of low
birth weight infants."5 ' Additionally, in Lewis VI, the district
court again found it "undisputed that routine prenatal care is
more cost-effective than treating preventable birth defects and
low birth weight after a child's birth."'5 The courts should have
applied their strong belief in the "undisputed" benefit of
providing prenatal care toward their rational basis review of
the plaintiffs' claim. Doing so, they would have found that the
deprivation of prenatal care lacks a rational relationship to the
Welfare Reform Act's objectives.
B. Justifications for Higher Equal Protection Review
The facts accepted by the courts in Lewis force a
conclusion that denying prenatal care to noncitizens violates
their equal protection rights. The Lewis courts found, however,
150 8 U.S.C. § 1601(4) (2000).
"' See, e.g., Lewis V, 965 F.2d 1206, 1218 (2d Cir. 1992); Lewis VI, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (E.D.N.Y. 1991);
see also, Boswell, supra note 149, at 1478 ("Ineligible aliens most often defer medical
treatment until their problems have become life threatening and thereby more
costly."); Stacey M. Schwartz, Note, Beaten Before They Are Born: Immigrants, Their
Children, and a Right to Prenatal Care, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 695 (1997) (discussing
the cost effectiveness of prenatal care).
152 See Lewis V, 965 F.2d at 1218-19; Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. at 1201.
15 Lewis V, 965 F.2d at 1219 (paraphrasing 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3688);
Lewis IV, 794 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3688).
14 Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
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that Mathews v. Diaz"' foreclosed the possibility of truly
testing the discriminatory law's underlying basis.
In Mathews, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
restrictive federal residency classifications that denied certain
noncitizens supplemental medical insurance benefits. 6 The
Court explained that "a host of constitutional and statutory
provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction
between citizens and aliens may justify . . . benefits for one
class not accorded to the other . ,, ." Thus, Congress may
create rules for noncitizens "that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.""8 The Court adopted a deferential standard
for reviewing alienage classifications, one that would call for
the invalidation of such laws only if they were "wholly
irrational.""9 The Lewis courts' reliance on Mathews, however,
was misplaced. Two additional, albeit somewhat doctrinally
inconsistent, strains of equal protection jurisprudence confer
authority for more exacting review of the discriminatory
classifications at issue in Lewis.
In a 1971 case, decided before Mathews, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional state residency classifications that
denied welfare benefits to immigrants.6 6 In Graham v.
Richardson,' the Court declared that "classifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."6' Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court held that the state's proposed "justification
of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and
unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of
aliens."' Recognizing that noncitizens "like citizens pay taxes
and may be called into the armed forces," the Court found the
states' discrimination unjustifiable. 64 Therefore, when a state
155 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
116 See id.
157 Id. at 78-79.
158 Id. at 80.
159 Id. at 83.
16' Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 372 (emphasis added). In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886),
the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects noncitizens residing
within the United States. Ten years later, the Court applied the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause to noncitizens, in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
16 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376 (internal quotes omitted).
16 Id. (internal quotes omitted). On these same grounds, in Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 639, 645 (1973), the Court invalidated New York's statutory
scheme that denied all noncitizens eligibility for competitive civil service jobs.
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seeks to discriminate against a noncitizen, the Court requires
the state to advance a "substantial purpose""5 by means
"precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose."' 6
While the Graham Court based its holding, in part, on
preemption grounds,"' it embraced an equal protection
methodology grounded in the premise that "[a]liens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority... for
whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."' In a
later case, the Court justified heightened scrutiny with the
rationale that alienage and national origin "are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest
that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the
burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others."'69
Long before the Court deemed state law alienage
classifications suspect, in 1938, Justice Stone expressed
concern that restrictions on a minority group's participation in
the political process made them particularly vulnerable to
infringements of their constitutional rights.' Skeptical of
"statutes directed at particular religious, ... national, . . .or
racial minorities,""' Justice Stone suggested that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition . .which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry."'72
Yet, while the Court considers state alienage
classifications "suspect,"' this classification gives way under
16 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 643.
166 id.
167 Graham, 403 U.S. at 377-80. The Court reiterated that Congress has
"broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the
United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before
naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization." Id. at 377
(quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
'68 Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938)).
'6 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
170 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), for a refinement of
Justice Stone's view known as the "representation-reinforcement" theory. This theory
recognizes that minority groups and the disenfranchised, like the plaintiffs in Lewis,
may lack means of effectively shaping, and responding to, the political process.
Therefore, when a legislative act further marginalizes these groups or compromises
their constitutional rights, the judiciary should closely scrutinize the challenged law,
thereby filling a gap in the democratic process. See id.
.. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
172 Id.
173 The Supreme Court applies a political function exception to strict scrutiny
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its contrary approach to federal classifications, whereby
suspect status vanishes entirely. 17 4 Attempting to reconcile
these inconsistent approaches, the Mathews Court explained
that "it is the business of the political branches of the Federal
Government, rather than that of either the States or the
Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and
residence of aliens." 7' This justification fails to explain why
federal alienage classifications are less suspect than state
classifications.'76 Laying aside that nagging question, however,
the argument still stands that courts need not apply strict
scrutiny to federal laws to give effect to Graham's holding that
discrimination against noncitizens demands judicial attention.
As the Supreme Court recently stated in Zadvydas v. Davis,171
in the arena of its immigration and naturalization, Congress'
"power is subject to important constitutional limitations."78
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has subjected
discriminatory laws that affect rights or privileges to more
rigorous scrutiny under rational basis review than the courts
applied in Lewis.7 ' Although the Court has stated that rational
basis review consists of a single standard, 8 ° and that laws
under this test are "presumed to be valid," 8' it has also probed
of state classifications that limit a noncitizen's participation in the state's political
domain. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) ("[O]ur scrutiny
will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a State's
constitutional prerogatives and constitutional responsibility for the establishment
[and] operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an appropriately
designated class of public office holders.") (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 643,
648 (1973)).
171 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1973). Note Justice Stevens's
explanation that "it is not 'political hypocrisy' to recognize that the Fourteenth
Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional
provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization." Id. at
86-87.
'"' Id. at 84.
176 See, e.g., Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 294 (arguing that the
federal government's authority over immigration policy "does not in any obvious way
explain why the burden of justification on the federal government should be different
from the burden on a state").
177 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
178 Id. at 695. The Court noted that, in the realm of immigration and
naturalization law, "Congress must choose 'a constitutionally permissible means of
implementing' [its] power." Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983)).
179 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973).
180 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 446.
'8' Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
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the underlying bases of laws that discriminate against discrete
groups. In so doing, the Court has applied rational basis review
but still held that a discriminatory law serves an illegitimate
end,12 or employs irrational means to a legitimate end."3
For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.," the Court applied rational basis review in
declaring unconstitutional a state law restricting land usage
for group homes housing the mentally challenged. While
finding that a state may legitimately differentiate between the
mentally challenged and able, the Court closely scrutinized the
law and was persuaded by contradictory evidence that belied
each of the state's justifications for treating the two groups
differently.
8
The Court has also engaged in searching review of
classifications under federal law. In Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno,' the Court invalidated a federal law that denied
food stamps to households where the occupants were unrelated
to one another by blood or marriage.'87 The Government
asserted that Congress intended for the law to increase
national nutrition standards. Seemingly influenced by
legislative history indicating that disdain for "hippies" inspired
the welfare restriction, the Court found the law "clearly
irrelevant" to this purported objective. 188 Certainly, the Court
did not consider the elevation of nutritional health an
illegitimate legislative objective. By looking beyond Congress'
bald assertions, however, the Court gleaned prejudice at the
law's base. Had the courts in Lewis undertaken a similar level
of analysis, they would have found that depriving pregnant
noncitizens prenatal care funding is irrelevant, indeed
counterproductive, to realizing the Welfare Reform Act's
ends. 89
See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
183 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Moreno, 413 U.S. 528; Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972).
184 473 U.S. at 448-50.
185 Id.
188 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 534. But cf. Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988) (upholding
a denial of federal food stamp aid to households where a member is on strike and
finding legitimate the "governmental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side
or the other in private labor disputes").
1"9 See discussion supra Part II.A (highlighting the Lewis courts' findings that
denying immigrant women prenatal care will not promote self-sufficiency or deter
immigration, but will increase costs).
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Moreover, the grave impact of denying poor women
funding for prenatal care should have given the Second Circuit
pause. The court acknowledged the "substantial harm to the
children of the alien mothers as a result of the [Welfare
Reform] Act,"19° but failed to consider how these mothers would
bear the burden of caring for children who suffered from
debilitating physical and mental conditions. 1 ' The district
court recognized this harm suffered by the plaintiffs, but only
in relation to upholding their children's rights.'92 This burden,
disparately cast on a group of women for whom the Supreme
Court would require extra solicitude if this were a case arising
under state law, 9' should have commanded more of the Second
Circuit's attention. When a federal law discriminates against
an immigrant population in the distribution of welfare benefits,
as in Lewis, courts should heed Justice Marshall's reminder
that the rational basis test, "although deferential, 'is not a
toothless one." 94
Extra solicitude is particularly warranted when the
federal alienage classification fails to govern who may enter,
and reside in, the country. When a federal alienage
classification bears no relationship to Congress' immigration
and naturalization goals, its underlying rationale becomes
suspect. The Lewis courts found Congress' rationales for
denying pregnant noncitizens need-based funding for prenatal
care implausible.9 Yet, neither court stopped to consider that
Congress' plenary power over immigration and naturalization
does not constitute a blanket grant of authority. Relying
heavily and unwisely on Mathews v. Diaz,9 ' the Lewis courts
failed to check whether Congress acted within the scope of its
constitutional authority, and thus, undermined their roles as
guardians of constitutional rights.
190 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d 567, 579 (2d Cir. 2001).
191 It appears that the plaintiffs argued that "a heightened level of scrutiny is
appropriate to the extent that [they] are asserting the harm to the children they will
bear," but they somehow hinged this claim on gender-based discrimination. See id. at
582. The Second Circuit's brief discussion of this claim makes its contours difficult to
discern. However, the argument remains that the court failed to consider how the
burden of caring for disabled children disparately impacted the plaintiff mothers.
192 See Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 164, 185 (2000).
193 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
19 Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 375 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
'9' See discussion supra Part II.A.
19 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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III. REIGNING IN CONGRESS' PLENARY POWER
The Supreme Court held for the first time that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause protects noncitizens in Wong
Wing v. United States."97 Justice Field explained that "[a]
resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under
the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the
laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a
consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those
laws."9' Unfortunately, the Court has failed to give full effect to
this equal protection guarantee. Judicial review of federal laws
that in any way involve immigration policy is so extremely
deferential that courts virtually abandon their judicial role.'
Applying Mathews, courts have provided little more than
rubber stamp approval of laws that discriminate against
immigrants.
Yielding to Congress' assertion of power, the Second
Circuit and district court discarded their findings that denying
access to prenatal care will not engender self-reliance, deter
immigration or save money. Binding their discussions with
exhaustive quotation of Mathews, both courts gave the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim little more than a cursory
review."' Although the Second Circuit considered the federal
government's reasons for depriving noncitizens prenatal care
"dubious," "' it never questioned Congress' authority to
discriminate against noncitizens on such flimsy grounds. Other
federal courts have joined the Second Circuit in dispensing
with thorough analysis, along with their judicial role as
constitutional guardians, as soon as their ears caught the
phrase "immigration policy."
For example, in Aleman v. Glickman,2 °2 the Ninth
Circuit rejected the equal protection claim of a sixty-two-year-
197 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
'9s Id. at 242 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80; see Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 170 (E.D.N.Y.
2000).
200 Lewis VII, 252 F.3d 567, 582-83 (2d. Cir 2001); Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d
at 182. The district court, however, noted that Lewis VI differed from Supreme Court
precedent, in that the plaintiffs' claim "does not directly relate to Congress' 'broad
power to determine which classes of aliens may lawfully enter the country.' . . .
[R]ather, the [challenged] provision concerns the provision of welfare benefits to
aliens." Lewis VI, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 181 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794
(1977)).
... Lewis VII, 252 F.3d at 583.
202 217 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2000).
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old noncitizen denied food stamps under the Welfare Reform
Act after she divorced her citizen husband of nineteen years."3
Unlike the Second Circuit in Lewis, the Ninth Circuit at least
recognized the force of Aleman's argument that congressional
power over the allocation of public welfare benefits does not
stem from the same source of congressional power over
immigration policy.2 4 Like the Second Circuit, however, the
Ninth Circuit applied Mathews and, therefore, remained
impervious to the challenged law's irrational basis.0 5 The court
expressed discomfort with its ultimate decision, but, compelled
by Mathews, it dared not question the contours of congressional
authority.
Every federal court that has entertained equal
protection challenges to discrimination under the Welfare
Reform Act has sanctioned its inequity under the rational basis
test.0 6 These courts never questioned the precedent on which
their holdings relied, and have concluded with little difficulty
that "the decision to discriminate among aliens in the provision
of welfare benefits is a decision that lies within Congress'
plenary power over immigration."2 7
The courts deferentially bow to Congress by mistaking
meaningful judicial review for interference with national
immigration policy.0 8 Shrinking under "the blinding power of
the word 'plenary,'"2" the federal courts are failing to recognize
that Congress' plenary power over immigration and
naturalization ends where its laws no longer implicate
immigration and naturalization policy. As Lawrence Tribe has
argued:
[o]utside the context of entry, stay, and naturalization, congressional
authority to ... draw lines ... among aliens in the distribution of
benefits, loses its clear connection to considerations of national
203 Id. at 1201. Widowed, but not divorced, noncitizens are entitled to public
benefits under the Welfare Reform Act. See id. at 1195.
204 See id. at 1199.
205 Id. at 1197.
'0' See Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999); Rodriguez v. United
States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999); Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Minn.
1998); Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). But cf. Aliessa v. Novello,
96 N.Y.2d 418, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2001) (applying strict scrutiny to a
state law enacted pursuant to the Welfare Reform Act and declaring the law
unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions).
207 Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1349.
208 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 65, 82 (1976)).
'o9 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Here and There: Federal Regulation of Aliens and
the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 869 (1989).
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sovereignty and foreign policy; outside those limited contexts courts
210
should thus feel freer to limit congressional power.
The Constitution does not explicitly or clearly define
Congress' "broad power" over immigration and
naturalization.2 1' Nor must the Constitution be read to
authorize Congress' power to discriminate against noncitizens
residing in this country with the government's permission. As
one scholar proposed, analysis of Congress' authority to deprive
noncitizens access to federal public benefits based on alienage
classifications should move beyond Mathews and ask:
To what extent do national concerns with protecting the boundaries
of territory and membership properly structure the status of
noncitizens currently residing in the national territory and
participating in national life?
2 12
Advancing several justifications for elevated
constitutional protection of noncitizens' rights, some scholars
argue that the Constitution limits the vast power Mathews
accords Congress.213  Although academics propose multiple
theories for constraining Mathews's "unbridled discretion,"214
they share common normative ground in demanding equitable
210 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 5-18, 975 (3d ed.
2000). The Ninth Circuit recognized this argument in Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d
1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the court expressed its resignation: "Although
this argument may have some logical merit, it is foreclosed by Diaz." Id.
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing for Congress' authority "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (providing
for the power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offenses against the Law of Nations"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (authorizing
power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water"); U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 ("No State shall
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports
or Exports"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with ... a foreign Power"); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring "two-thirds of the Senators present concur" on the
Executive's treaty-making, and the "Advice and Consent of the Senate" for
appointment of ambassadors).
212 Bosniak, supra note 1, at 1055-56.
213 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 210; Aleinkoff, supra note 209; Bosniak, supra
note 1, at 1056; Gerald Rosberg, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants in American
Law: Discrimination Against the "Nonresident" Alien, 44 U. Pirrr. L. REV. 399 (1983);
Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community,
81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden
Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965 [hereinafter Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door].
214 Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, supra note 213, at
1031.
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treatment of individuals whom Congress has admitted into the
national community.215 Mathews rejected the notion that the
Constitution's prohibition against disparate treatment curbs
Congress' power to discriminate against noncitizens legally
residing in this country. 16 The Court's imperviousness to the
fact that the distribution of public benefits often fails to
implicate national foreign policy, however, places Mathews's
logical underpinnings on untenable grounds.
Courts diminish the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws by "wrongly assum[ing] that every
federal regulation based on alienage is necessarily sustainable
as an exercise of the immigration power."217 Professor Linda
Bosniak challenges the Court's sweeping assumptions in
Mathews by questioning what the Court took for granted:
"whether discriminatory treatment of aliens is to be understood
as a legitimate exercise of the government's power to regulate
membership or as an illegitimate violation of their rights as
persons."21
Indeed, when addressing alienage classifications that
restrict a noncitizen's participation in a state's political life, the
Court distinguishes the state's power to regulate membership
from its power to discriminate against noncitizens in the
distribution of welfare benefits.19 In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,2 0
it explained:
[Tlhe Court has confronted claims distinguishing between the
economic and sovereign functions of government. This distinction
has been supported by the argument that although citizenship is not
a relevant ground for the distribution of economic benefits, it is a
relevant ground for determining membership in the political
221
community.
215 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 55-61 (1983) (arguing that allowing individuals to reside and
work within national borders, but denying those individuals equal political and social
benefits, creates a caste-like society); Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden
Door, supra note 213, at 1028 (arguing that the Court's concept of national sovereignty
in Mathews is outmoded, "since nation-states have agreed that even sovereigns must
abide by extra-sovereign obligations in the realm of human rights").
216 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976).
217 Aleinikoff, supra note 209, at 869.
218 Bosniak, supra note 1, at 1137-38.
211 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 438.
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Contrasted with its treatment of federal laws, the
Court's closer embrace of equal protection for noncitizens under
state laws, in cases like Graham v. Richardson,22 has produced
doctrinal inconsistencies and yielded unstable constitutional
protections. Since alienage classifications are "suspect" under
state law, courts should at least approach challenges to federal
classifications of noncitizens with sensitivity to the type of
power Congress actually wields under the guise of its
immigration authority.
When the Court invalidates a state law that
discriminates against noncitizens in the distribution of public
benefits, but upholds the very same federal law under lopsided
equal protection review, one cannot help but question whether
Congress' power over immigration and naturalization justifies
the disparate results. A cynic might note that Congress could
attempt to broaden its power base, after failing to apply its
immigration powers effectively, by taking advantage of the
judiciary's deference."' In the case of Lewis, however, a more
plausible rationale for Congress' discrimination against
noncitizen women is its desire to appear responsive to a
perceived national welfare crisis.
The Second Circuit expressed no discomfort in relying
on Mathews to deny the Lewis plaintiffs their right to federal
funding for prenatal care. Assuming an extraordinarily
deferential position from the outset of its inquiry, the court
skirted a critical level of analysis. The court presumed that
Congress' immigration and naturalization power authorizes it
to deny noncitizens, lawfully residing in this country, need-
based funding for prenatal care. This presumption is without
merit. If the Second Circuit had evaluated the actual sources of
222 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642
(1973) ("Our standard of review of statutes that treat aliens differently from citizens
requires a greater degree of precision.").
23 In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court hinted at this possibility in
discussing the plight of illegal immigrants:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this
country . . . has resulted in a substantial "shadow population" of illegal
immigrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders. This situation
raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens,
encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but
nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens
and lawful residents.
Id. at 218-19. However, the Court later reiterated that in the realm of the federal
government's power over immigration and naturalization, "[t]he obvious need for
delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this
field." Id. at 219 n.19.
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congressional power under the full lens of equal protection
jurisprudence, it may have found its deferential posture both
inappropriate and uncomfortable.
CONCLUSION
Lewis demonstrates that the sweeping expanse of
immigration powers engendered by Mathews can swallow the
Equal Protection Clause whole. If the courts had not used
Mathews as license to forego actual consideration of the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim, they would have held that
denying immigrant women prenatal care funding is wholly
unrelated to the Welfare Reform Act's objectives. Peering into
the chasm in this law's logic, a more plausible explanation for
restricting federal funding in this case emerges: Immigrant
women make an easy target in the war against welfare. Lewis
reminds us that when courts lower the bar of judicial review to
a subterranean level, turning a blind eye toward the possibility
of constitutional transgressions, they impoverish the
Constitution's protections.
Michele E. Kenneyt
t A.B., University of Chicago, 1996, J.D. candidate, 2003, Brooklyn Law
School.
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